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Abstract This article proposes the notion of a security imaginary as a 
heuristic tool for exploring military isomorphism (the phenomenon that 
weapons and military strategies begin to look the same across the world) at a 
time when the US model of defence transformation is being adopted by an 
increasing number of countries. Built on a critical constructivist foundation, 
the security-imaginary approach is contrasted with rationalist and neo-
institutionalist ways of explaining military diffusion and emulation. Merging 
cultural and constructivist themes, the article offers a 'strong cultural' 
argument to explain why a country would emulate a foreign military model 
and how this model is constituted in and comes to constitute a society's 
security imaginary. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 of 1990-91, the USA has showcased a model for military 
modernization in the information era. At first, this model was referred to as the 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), and more recently (post-9/11) as 
'transformation'. There is evidence that the RMA is the latest military model (in this 
case originating in the USA) to infuse the defence policies of an increasing number of 
states around the world, resulting in what is referred to as military isomorphism. 
Under the broader rubric of military change, or the more specific themes of military 
emulation and military diffusion, a number of authors have proffered explanations 
for military isomorphism (Goldman, 2006: 76). Neorealist explanations attribute the 
diffusion of a particular military model to the existence of a security imperative in the 
emulating country or competition for power in an anarchical international system 
(see, for example, Waltz, 1979: 127; Taliaferro, 2006; Horowitz, 2006; Resende-
Santos, 2007). Neo-institutional explanations focus on the extent to which states and 
institutions in states interact with and become socialized, not least through 
professional networks, into the world cultural order (Demchak, 2000, 2002; Farrell, 
2002b, 2005; Eyre & Suchman, 1996). Domestic political and structural explanations 
highlight the extent to which domestic interests can be mobilized for novel ideas 
through advocacy groups, entrepreneurs and political leadership (Farrell, 2001; 
Avant, 2000). Cultural theories in turn attribute military emulation to cultural 
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overlap between societies and the extent to which cultural diversity is tolerated in the 
target society (see Checkel, 1999; Goldman, 2006; Goldman & Eliason, 2003). 
This article contributes to the interrogation of the process of military isomorphism by 
developing the idea of a security imaginary as a heuristic tool. At the time the Berlin 
Wall came down, Mary Kaldor (1990), the British academic and military analyst, 
vividly described the Cold War as an imaginary war. This imaginary war between 
East and West was brought into currency by military exercises, war games, espionage 
stories, the training of millions of soldiers and hostile rhetoric. 'Each system, at least 
in the imagination, threatened the very existence of the other. It was a struggle 
between good and evil of epic proportions. And it was substantiated by a real military 
confrontation and, indeed, real wars in remote parts of the world' (Kaldor, 1990: 6-7). 
Kaldor argued that the experience of World War II provided a formula for states to 
deal with deep-rooted problems in societies. The Cold War was a replication of that 
experience, a way to impose and extend two variants of capitalism and socialism, 
respectively, to 'blocs' of states. The construction of ideological animosity on such a 
grand scale as a formula to deal with societal problems in the postwar era was not 
premeditated or conspired, but an interpretation of the world that eventually came to 
constitute the world - that is, that had real effects on policy and lives. 
 
Like Kaldor's idea of an 'imaginary war', the notion of a security imaginary is founded 
on the belief that security and insecurity (or threat) are not objective realities that can 
be observed and responded to, but are constructed through the fixing of meanings to 
things, an identity to 'the self' and others, and the relationships that are thus 
instituted. In this sense, the present article places culture at the centre of analysis, 
since culture is the context within which people make sense of the world around them 
and which is indeed the source of their impetus to act in a certain way and not 
another. In the collective, diverse imagination of a people, its members think about 
the 'threats' for their society, and the means to avoid or resist those threats. Features 
of the security imaginary are substantiated by political and social discourse. Journals, 
speeches, studies, proposals, conversations, reports, news broadcasts and accounts of 
all kinds contribute to, and draw from, negotiated understandings of circumstances, 
capabilities and 'others'. The security imaginary is thus not make-believe, but a 
powerful presence in political and social life that amply evidences and reproduces 
itself. 
 
The present article starts off by juxtaposing the constructivist basis of the security-
imaginary approach with the rationalist basis of neorealism, showing how the latter is 
inadequate to explain military isomorphism. Second, the article proceeds to explain 
the heuristic of a security imaginary and to situate it within constructivist literature in 
international relations (IR) and security studies. Finally, it illustrates how the 
security-imaginary heuristic can be applied to enrich our understanding of military 
isomorphism. 
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The Shortcomings of a Rationalist Approach 
Diffusion can be defined as 'the process that involves the transmission of new 
information; the decision by elites to adopt new technologies, ideas, and practices; 
and ultimately the assimilation of those ideas into institutions and practices' 
(Goldman, 2006: 69). For neorealists, military diffusion is related to external threat. 
States facing external insecurity will more likely adapt their military models to those 
'contrived by the country of greatest capability and ingenuity' (Waltz, 1979: 127). 
Based on a rationalist approach to defence policymaking (and therefore choices about 
military models), neorealism assumes 'insecurity' or 'threat' exists objectively and can 
be known with some certainty. Policymakers, and those who influence them, thus 
identify insecurities (or security threats) and propose appropriate responses, judging 
the most effective action in a certain historical, economic, political and technological 
context. Moreover, in a competitive international system, it is 'rational' for states to 
emulate the most advanced military models, a process only inhibited by a lack of 
information and resources (Waltz, 1979: 127).1 
 
This article moves away from a rationalist epistemology.2 It draws on readings of 
social imaginaries in the work of, among others, Cornelius Castoriadis (1987) and 
Charles Taylor (2004). Both these authors emphasize the importance of 
understanding the negotiation of cultural meanings in society. Theoretically, the 
article is thus grounded in constructivism and employs an interpretive methodology 
that is in essence concerned with decoding and explaining meaning. As Bevir & 
Rhodes (2004: 131-132) assert, 'Interpretive approaches start with the insight that to 
understand actions, practices and institutions, we need to grasp the relevant 
meanings, beliefs and preferences of the people involved.' In this sense, culture, 
defined as 'webs of meaning', becomes central, because meaning is context specific 
and humans and social groups negotiate it. In the words of Clifford Geertz (1993: 9), 
'I take culture to be those webs [of signification], and the analysis of it to be therefore 
not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of 
meaning.'3 
 
A study by Emily E. Goldman & Thomas G. Mahnken (2004) on the diffusion of the 
RMA in Asia can be used to illustrate the difference between a rationalist and a 
constructivist/interpretive approach. Goldman and her team of researchers aim to 
establish both the extent to and the way in which the RMA (or elements thereof) is 
adopted and adapted by a state. The study follows the methodology of so-called 
diffusion diagnostics, which involves four key tasks that form the basis of 
investigation. These are: (1) identifying the incentives or motives to adopt new 
                                                 
1
 See Taliaferro (2006) for a neoclassical realist argument of how the state's ability to extract resources affects 
military diffusion. See also Demchak's (2000) accounts of how developing countries overcome resource scarcity 
when emulating the RMA. 
2
 It is recognized that both neorealist and pluralist explanations of military isomorphism share a rationalist 
foundation; see Farrell (2005). 
3
 The convergence of culturalist and constructivist themes is in line with Farrell's (2002a) call for a coherent 
cultural/constructivist research programme. 
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practices; (2) identifying the models that are likely to be targets of adoption or off-
sets; (3) identifying the ease with which military technology and ideas are likely to be 
absorbed in different environments; and (4) capturing the results of military diffusion 
within states and organisations in order to understand indigenous patterns and the 
range of possible adaptations (Goldman, 2004: 4). 
 
Diffusion diagnostics emphasizes how a response to insecurity (or an approach to 
security - the RMA) is selected and altered to fit the peculiarities of a country's 
security environment. In contrast, a constructivist approach, as elaborated in this 
article, aims to establish the extent to and ways in which the RMA (or elements 
thereof) is adopted (consciously or unconsciously) and adapted (consciously or 
unconsciously) to fit a country's particular security environment as this environment 
is constituted by society. It also aims to outline how that environment (or the security 
imaginary that constitutes that environment) is changed through a dialectical 
process. The emphasis is on this dialectic between response and understanding of a 
security world. 
 
Tim Huxley's (2004) exploration of RMA adoption in Singapore as part of the 
Goldman study illustrates this distinction. Huxley asserts that 'geopolitical 
circumstances have forced Singapore's government to take defence extremely 
seriously since the city-state separated from Malaysia in 1965'. Geopolitical 
circumstances are portrayed as objectively given, not as a function of perception. The 
fact that 'Singapore's leaders have increasingly stressed the importance of exploiting 
technology to compensate for the lack of strategic depth and shortage of professional 
military manpower' is seen as part of an objective calculus in their peculiar 
geopolitical situation. 
 
A constructivist approach would ask to what extent this objective choice to pursue the 
RMA is subjectively based. It would concentrate more on the cultural raw material 
that those who influence defence policy draw on when they interpret their security 
situation and choose a response to it. In addition, it would explore how cultural raw 
material finds expression in organizations. The work of Lynn Eden (2004) can be 
used to shed light on this aspect. Eden employs the concepts 'organizational frames' 
and 'knowledge-laden organizational routines'. An organizational frame can be 
identified by looking at what problems actors in an organization are trying to solve, 
how they conceive of solutions, what assumptions about the world and organizational 
purpose they bring to problem-solving, and how they explain why their acts are 
sensible. Organizational frames become operational and codified in the form of 
knowledge-laden routines. These routines are based on the capacity that an 
organization builds through allocating resources and drawing on expertise to solve 
the problems it has identified and decided to solve. What has become organizational 
'common sense' is embedded in organizational routines. In this sense, the 
organizational frames and routines of a state's armed forces can be studied to get a 
sense of the security imaginary (see also Farrell, 1996). 
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An interpretive methodology would also open the way to a more critical appraisal of 
the impact of the US construction of the RMA as a universal and inevitable model for 
state defence in the 21st century on Singapore's perceptions of military security, 
especially given that country's close military ties with the United States. Finally, it 
would ask how the pursuit of the RMA might impact on organizational frames and, in 
turn, cultural factors that ground Singaporean security perceptions. Huxley (2004) 
quotes a young army officer writing in 1992: 
Our Asian heritage has unfortunately put too much premium on the value of 'face'. We are exceedingly 
hierarchy-conscious to the extent that constructive criticism is extremely rare from bottom-up. It will 
take much time and deliberate effort to dispel the fear of . . . subordinates to speak up if they think 
their superiors are in the wrong, and for the latter to accept constructive criticism. 
 
This recurring emphasis on the need for decentralized command structures in 
Singaporean defence journals is regarded by Huxley as a necessary step towards the 
adoption of the RMA. An interpretive approach would see this as a good example of 
how the adoption of the RMA (construed as essential for dealing with 21st-century 
threats) informs organizational frames and, in turn, broader constructions of identity 
in society. The dialectic process between response and the understanding of the 
security world outlined above would be made explicit. In this respect, such an 
interpretive approach could also lead into an exploration and critique of the extent to 
which the RMA is essentially changing how Singaporeans see themselves and their 
security world. 
 
The circular construction of public mind and military self-understanding occurs 
through military images/propaganda as well as through economic and social 
restructuring to mobilize the resources needed to develop or acquire a military 
model. A good illustration is the case of South Africa under apartheid. The acquisition 
and reverse engineering of Western military technology (despite arms boycotts) by 
South Africa, which imagined itself as an outpost of the West during the Cold War 
under threat from a 'total communist onslaught' (Nathan, Batchelor & Lamb, 1997), 
reproduced its Western identity in the public mind. Coffee-table books on the South 
African-Angolan war and military parades imprinted an image of a 'legitimate' 
Western defence force fighting illegitimate communist terrorists, while efforts to 
sustain the country's forward-defence model reverberated throughout society. Not 
only were vast sections of the economy geared towards sustaining the apartheid war 
machine, but militarization of society already started at school level (Batchelor & 
Willett, 1998: 102).4 This is not a unique situation. Examples abound of how military 
models infuse the public mind, whether they be the 'duck and cover' exercises taught 
to US citizens during the Cold War or military funding of university programmes to 
produce the graduates and research necessary to sustain a particular military model. 
The Goldman study seems to go beyond a purely rationalist approach by 
acknowledging cultural factors - such as institutional inertia, power relations and 
existing identities within 'the state' - that inhibit or enable RMA diffusion. In fact, it 
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 For further discussion of the militarization of South African society during this period, see Cock & Nathan 
(1989) and Grundy (1988). 
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concludes that 'cultural factors (e.g., shared values about how society should be 
structured and function, and about the purpose and limits of armed violence) are 
widely cited in literature as critical to diffusion' (Goldman, 2002: 20). In some 
instances, the study discards the ontological assumptions of neorealism - for 
example, that the state is a unitary 'rational' actor. At first glance, the prominence 
placed on culture might be regarded as nothing else than a description of a society's 
security imaginary. However, a key element of the notion of (a social or security) 
imaginary is that there is a continual, reciprocal and constitutive relationship 
between what people do and what they think they should do, thus between 
understanding and practice (so-called performative actions). Although the Goldman 
study's inclusion of cultural factors and their impact on the RMA has the potential to 
explain this dialectic, the explanation is truncated, failing to take the next step and 
recognize that there is a mutually constitutive relationship. This leaves the reader 
with the impression that the security environment is regarded as objectively given, 
external to society and not constituted. It can objectively be determined, and 
countries respond to it through the policies they adopt. The RMA changes these 
policies as it is adopted, but it does not change the way in which the security 
environment is constructed. In contrast to a construc- tivist/interpretive view of the 
RMA and RMA diffusion, for the authors of the Goldman study the existing security 
imaginary (thesis) and the RMA (antithesis) never really fuse into a new - constituted 
- security world (synthesis). Consequently, their (rationalist) methodology (diffusion 
diagnostics) gives rise to a linear causal approach to RMA diffusion. 
 
Apart from different epistemological presumptions, the truncated explanation might 
in some way also be the result of the objective implicit in the Goldman study. As 
Robert Cox famously asserted in a 1981 article, theory is always for someone and for 
some purpose. Goldman (2002: 1) expresses the study's purpose as follows: 
Even as [US military leaders] try to prod the process [the unfolding RMA] along within the United 
States armed forces in the hopes of prolonging American military preeminence, they must attend to 
the RMA's diffusion abroad for dynamics outside of the United States will determine the future of the 
current RMA as much as, if not more than, developments inside the United States. 
 
If the goal of the study, then, is to collect information about RMA diffusion for US 
decision-makers, it is clear that the next step of the dialectic between the RMA and 
the security imaginaries of those countries emulating the RMA is irrelevant. For the 
authors of the Goldman study, it does not matter how the RMA informs the collective 
Singaporean mind: the aim is to determine whether the Singaporean military might 
be taking greater advantage of the RMA and how that will affect US security. 
 
This is typical of what Cox (1992) calls 'problem-solving' theory, 'which takes the 
present as given and reasons about how to deal with particular problems within the 
existing order of things', as opposed to critical theory, which 'stands back from the 
existing order of things to ask how that order came into being, how it may be 
changing, and how that change may be influenced or channelled'. A key difference is 
that a problem-solving approach 'focuses synchronically upon the immediate and 
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reasons in terms of fixed relationships, [whereas] critical theory works in a more 
historical and diachronic dimension'. 
 
An interpretive methodology for the study of military isomorphism would place 
emphasis on the nature of change (if any) that the diffusion of the RMA is bringing 
about in the constitution of security in other countries. It is thus necessary to study 
change in greater depth than that articulated in policy documents or statements by 
elite strata in society about security. Although these 'first-order' changes manifesting 
in an immediately observable way might portray perceptions of the security world, 
they are not a mirror image of the security imaginary, which denotes a much more 
complex and wider cultural background to social practices. 
 
A rationalist approach can be criticized in two respects. First, it makes certain 
ontological presumptions (both factual and normative) about international relations, 
such as the existence of international anarchy and how states pursue their interests 
within such an international society. These presumptions lead not only to a one-sided 
view of international relations, but to the reproduction of this distorted construction 
of international relations. Second, the positivist epistemology of a traditional 
approach does not acknowledge subjectivity in security thinking and practice, and 
thus minimizes the role attributed to culture in security-related practices. Even when 
cultural factors are acknowledged, a rationalist approach does not go far enough in 
recognizing the dynamic nature of culture and therefore negates the dialectical 
relationship between security practices and cultural factors. Culture is but a variable, 
and the relationship between culture and RMA adoption is treated as causal, rather 
than constitutive (see Weldes, 2003: 8). 
Tracing the Contours of a Security Imaginary 
Having outlined the inadequacy of the rationalist basis of neorealist explanations of 
military isomorphism, I will now examine the heuristic of a security imaginary and 
how it comes into being through the interaction among knowledge, power and 
practice. 
 
As noted above, the first-order changes as consciously articulated in aspects of 
security policy are insufficient to gauge the impact of the RMA on a society. This is 
precisely because they might only reflect disembodied ideas of an elite regarding what 
they think security policy should look like. The security imaginary is not reducible to 
these articulations. Taylor (2004: 23) notes that the social imaginary is how 'ordinary 
people' (in addition to civil servants, professors of security studies or the CEOs of 
arms companies) imagine their social environment. It is shared by large groups of 
people, if not society as a whole, and is the common understanding that makes 
common practices possible and as a result creates a shared sense of legitimacy. 
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To delineate a structuring principle of the common understandings that make 
security practices possible in a society is not an easy task. Like other imaginary social 
significations (e.g. God in religious cultures), those primary significations that 
constitute the security world have no precise place of existence where one might look 
for them. The collective subconscious of society is difficult to study in Freudian 
fashion. An aggravating factor is that, where security of the state is concerned, 
'ordinary people' often have little direct say in decisions to go to war or to buy certain 
arms and not others. However, if ordinary people's acceptance or rejection of (or 
indifference to) their exclusion from security policy is seen as an act of cultural 
expression, it may well provide a pointer to a structuring principle. For example, the 
apathy of ordinary people in relation to their marginalization in state security policy 
could be explained and problematized, instead of being overlooked as a given of the 
Westphalian system. In the same sense, a critical interpretation of security practices 
(and not just those by elites in the security sector) that have become common sense 
might offer a glimpse of the context of deeper cultural meanings concerning the 
security world. 
 
The argument thus links up with David Campbell's (1988) Writing Security, a key 
constructivist text in IR. Campbell explains the Cold War in terms of representations 
of US and Soviet Union identity as opposed to material threat. For Campbell, a set of 
representational practices must be redeployed to continually reproduce identity (an 
understanding of the self, others and the world). Similarly, the interpretation of 
security practices argued for here is critical as opposed to conventional (Hopf, 1998: 
181-185). Conventional constructivism leaves space for a positivist methodology (or 
'normal science') and claims to be normatively neutral. It treats identity as a cause of 
state action and leaves it at that. This is a position that critical constructivists cannot 
fathom, because they see theory as constitutive. In addition, critical constructivism 
aims at 'exploding the myths associated with identity formation' by unmasking power 
relations in the interest of enlightenment and emancipation (Hopf, 1998: 184; see 
also Booth, 1991). It thus also 'claims an interest in change, and a capacity to foster 
change' (Hopf, 1998: 184), or, as Farrell (2002a: 59) dramatizes, 'social theory is a 
weapon for waging war on inequality and injustice in world politics'.5 
 
To facilitate a critical interpretation of how certain military models come to inform 
security imaginaries around the world, it is useful to outline the three analytically 
separable dimensions of the process of social representation implicit in a cultural 
approach. This will be done with an eye on how the military comes to be constructed 
in society. These dimensions are articulation, interpellation and enactment, and 
relate in particular to the relationship between power and the organization of social 
meanings (Althusser, 1970; Hall, 1980; Muppidi, 1999: 125). 
 
Articulation is the coming of a belief that two meaning-elements - such as 'military' 
and 'defence' - are naturally associated, linked to one another (see Hall, 1980: 324). 
Such associations are not necessarily intrinsic or self-evident. Their arrangement may 
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be conventional (i.e. a product of habit) or arbitrary (Muppidi, 1999: 125). The 
connection between 'statehood' and 'military capability' described by Eyre & 
Suchman (1996) is an example from the field of security of how certain terms and 
ideas come to connote one another. The authors argue that possessing a defence force 
has become a symbol of statehood aptly reflected in the following statement by 
Sylvanus Olympio, president of Togo from 1960 to 1966: 'We cannot be an 
independent nation without an army of some sort' (cited in Eyre & Suchman, 1996: 
79). A further case in point is Namibia, of which Eyre & Suchman (1996: 82) write: 
'As a symbol of their statehood, the incipient Namibian state created a flag and an 
army of more than a thousand soldiers. That the army was (and remains) essentially 
militarily insignificant when compared with those of its possible foes  is irrelevant to 
its clearly significant symbolic role.' 
 
Having a defence force is, however, not a necessary condition for statehood, as 
illustrated by Costa Rica's decision not to have one. And, contrary to how mainstream 
approaches to security would have it, the decision to have a defence force is also not 
based on external threat or necessitated by national interests that come with 
statehood. Rather, the thought of not having a defence force would, for most people 
who have to decide on this matter, 'violate their sense of being at that particular time 
and place' (Somers & Gibson, quoted in Latham, 2000: 16). These ideas are not 
unique to Togo or Namibia, but are transnational conceptions of what constitutes a 
'state'. 
 
Among articulated meanings are identities, what Foucault (1970) would call 'subject-
positions'. Subjects (or actors) are identified, and the roles they fulfil, their derivative 
interests and the relationships between them are conjured by forging links between 
sets of meanings. Articulation entails the weaving of an ontological narrative or 
telling a 'constitutive story' to make sense of the world or events, institutions or 
actions in the world (Latham, 2000: 16). 6These stories make use of extant cultural 
'raw material' such as linguistic resources or lived experience, but the story (or plot) 
that is imposed on a complex array of lived experience, for example, is selective and 
reductive. Rather than a true reflection, the narrative invokes from the range of 
experiences only those that can be interpreted in support of a storyline. In this 
respect, Jutta Weldes (1996: 295) outlines how the orthodox US story about the 
'Cuban missile crisis' was produced: 
the 'missile crisis' was constructed out of articulations that defined the Soviet Union, the United States, 
Latin America, the 'Western hemisphere', Cuba, the Castro government and 'the Cuban people' as 
particular kinds of objects. It depended as well on various quasi-causal arrangements, including the 
pervasive invocation of the 'Munich' syndrome and the dangers of appeasement, falling of dominoes 
and of Trojan horses.7 
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 For a discussion on ‘the narrative construction of reality’, see Bruner (1991). 
7
 For a discussion of how historical experience and policy are invoked and reinterpreted to justify policies in the 
present, see Buffet & Heuser (1998). 
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Officials (and others) build security narratives from 'real' facts and existing cultural 
'raw material' (used to fix meanings). As for 'real' facts, the sheer existence of things 
will govern how they may be adduced. That Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass 
destruction posed an imminent threat to world peace was discredited when no such 
weapons were found. Similarly, gaps in cultural raw materials limit narratives, 
prompting Weldes (1996: 286) to refer to 'the interpretive possibilities permitted by 
interactive discourses or inter- subjective structures of meaning available within a 
particular situation at a particular historical juncture'. The orthodox construction of 
the Cuban missile crisis benefited, for example, from the identities that were 
constructed around the Soviet Union and the United States from the 1940s onwards. 
People following a narrative sometimes see themselves in a character. In the 
narrative, the character's identity or subject-position is created by the articulation of 
meanings. Althusser (1970) terms being drawn into such an identity interpellation, 
the second dimension of representation. For the person drawn in, 'recruited' or 
'hailed' as a subject, the representation and the social relationships it constructs come 
to make sense. The extent to which people take up interpellations is an indication of 
the extent to which they are convinced and compelled by the associations between 
meanings in a narrative (Muppidi, 1999: 126). Or, as Jerome Bruner (1991: 13) would 
say, interpellation reflects the 'acceptability' of a narrative. 
 
Because connections between meanings are not intrinsic, they are often contested, 
and therefore articulation and interpellation involve what Muppidi (1999: 126) refers 
to as the 'politics of meaning fixing'. Social groups struggle among one another to 
gain pre-eminence over social thought and practice. One way to get the public (or 
officials, for that matter) to believe a storyline, and therefore to regard one set of links 
between meanings as legitimate and not another, is to state them consistently as 
natural, self-evident and unprob- lematic. To sustain the 'regime of truth' (to borrow 
again from Foucault [1980]) of a narrative, articulations must be reproduced 
continuously so that the connections are reconfirmed. The aim is for a particular 
representation of an object, event or person to become common sense - that is, 
'treated as if they neutrally or transparently reflected reality' (Weldes, 1996: 303).  
 
This stage of representation can be likened to Antonio Gramsci's notion of hegemony. 
Hegemony is a kind of dominance over social thought and practice so deeply rooted 
in social life that those who are being dominated regard it as natural. It is like a 
horizon beyond which society finds it impossible to look (Feenberg, 1995a: 10; see 
also Clifford Geertz's [1975] work on 'common sense'). Social groups engage in 
political work to fix meanings and sustain them, but they are not the only locus of 
agency that sustains a narrative. 
 
Enaction, the third dimension of representation, occurs when people have identified 
with a subject-position dictated by the social relations scripted in a narrative and start 
to enact the role that corresponds with their sense of identity. This 'social doing' in 
itself reproduces the links between meanings and as such sustains the narrative. In a 
similar way, security practices not only carry the understanding of security to 
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expression, but reproduce the security imaginary. The structure created by a narrative 
is therefore sustained by agency, and the agents are not only elites and officials that 
have power over opinion, but also 'ordinary people' that enact a narrative and in that 
way produce reality. Cynthia Enloe (1989: 16) takes up this point when she remarks 
that, as the wives of colonial administrators or as missionaries, travel writers and 
anthropologists, women from imperialist countries filled their roles in a way that 
perpetuated colonial subjugation of African, Latin American and Asian women, even 
if they were not themselves the architects of colonial policies and might themselves 
have been victims of gendered relations of power. 
 
The sources of power through which a narrative is created and sustained are 
manifold, and so too the power relations that a narrative creates. At this stage, it 
might be more useful to talk about discourse in the Foucauldian sense rather than 
ontological narratives, although the two are closely related. Discourse is a 'system of 
representation' that reflects the mutual reinforcing character of power and 
knowledge, conduct and language. People enact the identities that hailed them and 
view a storyline of a narrative as 'true' because a specific discourse turns up across 
different texts and practices at different social institutions, supporting the same 
framework for talking about and acting upon an issue. This Foucault referred to as a 
discursive formation (Hall, 1997: 44). 
 
The power that creates and sustains a discourse is not from a single source or in a 
single direction - for example, top down from the state or ruling class to the margins 
that have no resources or access to fix meanings for society based on their lived 
experience. Power circulates and permeates and is reproduced on every level of social 
life, whether public or private, the law and the economy, or the family and sexuality 
(Hall, 1997: 49). As a result of diverse forms of political power, there are thus 
multiple hierarchies. Moreover, the multiple hierarchies, Enloe (1996: 193) writes, 
do not sit on the social landscape like tuna, egg and cheese sandwiches sitting on an icy cafeteria 
counter, diversely multiple but unconnected. They relate to each other, sometimes in ways that subvert 
one another, sometimes in ways that provide each with their respective resiliency. The bedroom's 
hierarchy is not unconnected to the hierarchies of the international coffee exchange or of the foreign 
ministry. 
 
A final point related to power, knowledge and the formation of the imaginary, is that 
those at the 'margins . . . and bottom rungs' (Enloe, 1996) do not just wait to be 
interpellated and, even if interpellated, do not necessarily play the role scripted in the 
narrative in zombie-like fashion. There are forms of resistance aptly described by 
James Scott (1985) as 'weapons of the weak' that highlight how the 'powerless' assert 
their own understanding of the world within the framework of dominant discourses. 
Although ordinary people's perception of security is the target of manipulation by 
elites, they can also be the brake on elite adventurism. Judith Butler's (1993, 1997) 
notion of performativity can be invoked here to show that the mutually reinforcing 
relationship between understanding and doing does not necessarily imply continuity 
(i.e. affirmation of subjectivity). Butler understands the agency of a subject that 
engages in representational practices as socially constructed, but not predetermined. 
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Subjectivity (or, in this case, a particular understanding of security) need not be 
reproduced. Through a dialectic relationship between what people do and what they 
think they should do, diachronically, meanings can change (be renegotiated), and 
thus the social imaginary can transform itself over time (see Kubalkova, 1998: 30-31). 
This is also true for societies' imaginary of their security world. 
 
The complexity of a security imaginary should be clear from the above discussion. 
Multiple discourses feature and interact in the social imaginary and affect how people 
come to understand and practice security in a society. Power is important to fix 
meanings that would induce hegemony in the security world, but we should not only 
look to the conventional sources of power to get a sense of the security imaginary. For 
that, we have to include 'ordinary people' as well as the 'margins, silences and bottom 
rungs' and how they contribute to the constitution of security. Their contribution is 
especially on the interpretive level of social representation - in other words, where 
meanings come to connote things. Ordinary people's lived experience and cultural 
references provide the cultural raw material that could be drawn upon to legitimize 
denoted (first-order) meanings, which are forged by elites. 
 
There are two disconnects prevalent in the way security is often conceptualized in IR 
that cast doubt on whether IR is the appropriate location for the security-imaginary 
approach. First, IR makes an apparently commonsensical distinction between 'inside' 
(domestic) and 'outside' (international), and, second, IR is preoccupied with a 
military notion of security as opposed to non-military security. These disconnects are 
best reflected by the terms social security and national security, respectively. Social 
security entails soft policy issues in the domestic realm, such as old-age pensions. 
National security commonly denotes a foreign policy or military response directed at 
the outside world (Neocleous, 2006: 376, 364). It could surely be argued that 'for 
most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life 
than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, income security, 
security from crime - these are the emerging concerns of human security all over the 
world' (Wood & Shearing, 2007: 65). Given the inside/outside and military/non-
military disconnects, can IR cope with a widening of the security agenda not just to 
include non-military threats and individuals as referent objects of security (see 
Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998), but with (in)security as rooted in culture? 
 
 The answer can be gauged from Kaldor's insight that an imaginary war (the Cold 
War) was necessary to deal with societal problems in both the East and the West. The 
constructivist turn in IR provides theoretical space to question the apparent 
disconnects in IR's conceptions of security. What Kaldor recognizes implicitly, 
Neocleous (2006) makes explicit through tracing the conceptual, political and 
historical links between the concepts social security and national security in the 
United States during the 1930s. US President Franklin D. Roosevelt equated the New 
Deal with national security, noting 'our nation's programme of social and economic 
reform is therefore a part of defense, as basic as armaments themselves' (quoted in 
Neocleous, 2006: 375). But, Roosevelt's plan for US security did not stop at US 
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borders. It involved rolling out the same principle to the 'family of Nations', 
fabricating economic order on a global scale. In this sense, national security is not 
only defence of 'a way of life', but expanding/imposing 'a way of life'. Neocleous thus 
solves the security disconnects of mainstream IR through bringing together themes in 
security studies and international political economy. 
 
The security imaginary makes explicit the relationship between the social and the 
security imaginary. The notion of a security imaginary is not simply an extension of 
the concept 'social imaginary' so as to apply it to the study of security, but instead 
refers to that part of the social imaginary as 'a map of social space' that is specific to 
society's common understanding and expectations about security and makes 
practices related to security possible (see also Taylor's [2004: 26] remark on social 
space). The security imaginary takes cognizance of the cultural raw material that 
needs to be present for various associations (or meanings or 'signifieds') that the 
word 'security' might denote at different times for a society. Although this article 
deals with military isomorphism (and therefore a 'national security' issue), it is 
recognized that the emulation of a military model is framed in narratives of power 
and resistance. It cannot be seen separately from what Neocleous (2000, 2006) refers 
to as the fabrication of social and economic order both inside and outside the 
originating country. 
 
Having outlined the heuristic of a security imaginary and how it comes into being 
through the interaction among knowledge, power and practice, the article will now 
turn to the ways in which the security imaginary might come to be influenced by 
models of military transformation in other societies. 
Military Isomorphism as Homogenizing Security Imaginaries 
The social imaginary that invokes and is in turn reproduced by the real and symbolic 
connections that constitute a society and its boundaries is prone to change over time. 
Trans-societal exchanges result in the negotiation of new meanings and bring about a 
cultural dialectic that could transform the social imaginary. These exchanges are 
likely to increase as access to travel and information technology increases. As that 
part of the social imaginary that relates to the understanding of security in society, 
the security imaginary is also subject to change through this process. The security 
imaginary is therefore open to influence from perceptions, beliefs and 
understandings of other societies about security. 
 
One way of exploring this process is by means of sociological institutional- ism. As a 
constructivist approach, sociological institutionalism 'examines how norms evolve 
within transnational organizational fields, are diffused through transnational 
professional networks, and take worldwide effect' (Farrell, 2005: 450). Norms derive 
from shared beliefs about what can be considered normal and acceptable behaviour 
in a given situation in a society. Norms prescribe behaviour (what should be done) 
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based on a society's understanding of the world and its place in it. It is in this way 
that norms emanate from the social imaginary and in turn reproduce it. 
 
A sociological-institutionalist approach assumes that there are transnational norms 
that shape how states generate military power. Farrell (2005: 450) identifies two sets 
of norms in this respect, namely, norms of conventional warfare and norms of 
international humanitarian law. Norms of conventional warfare delineate the basic 
blueprint for military organization, namely, 'standing, standardized, technologically 
structured' (Farrell, 2005: 462) military forces. Norms of humanitarian law, in turn, 
outline what modes (e.g. genocide) and means (e.g. chemical weapons) of warfare are 
unacceptable. As such, they define what is morally appropriate behaviour in military 
operations. Farrell considers both sets of norms as expressions of world culture. For 
the purposes of the argument here, the present section will mainly focus on norms of 
conventional warfare. 
 
Farrell's approach is useful in that it tries to incorporate rationalist approaches in a 
constructivist theory to explain the seeming isomorphism in the way that states 
generate military power. In Farrell's view, this isomorphism is a result of normative 
pressure in addition to the logic of a security imperative, maximizing power and the 
notion that military organizations are by nature competitive. Similarly, bureaucratic 
or alliance politics transpire within a normative context. Policymakers may 
manipulate military policy to gain advantage for their own organizations (or 
themselves). States may direct alliance policy to favour their national interests. 
However, these factors occur within the framework of world military cultural norms. 
States organize their militaries in a certain way and engage in warfare in a certain way 
because that is what is expected of them as part of the society of states. To be sure, 
when a state perceives an increase in threat, it may stretch norms that are not well 
established or engage in strategic behaviour within the limits set by the norm to 
address the security imperative. In the same sense, in the event that policymakers 
manipulate bureaucratic or alliance policy, this behaviour is either overridden by 
normative pressure or legitimized by it (Farrell, 2005: 452). 
 
From the discussion of social representation, it should be clear that there is a two-
pronged process at work when it comes to the way normative pressure facilitates 
military isomorphism. First, norms need to be established. Certain practices need to 
be endowed with meaning, namely, that they are normal and acceptable behaviour for 
states to generate military power. This phase cannot be seen separately from 
international political discourses that create the hegemony (in a Gramscian sense) or 
obviousness (in an Althusserian sense) that determines what is 'normal and 
acceptable behaviour' for states. Latham (2000: 7) explains, for example, how the 
'historical and mutually constitutive relationship between discourses of the 'laws of 
war', on the one hand, and the politico-cultural identities of 'Christendom', 'Europe' 
and (most recently) 'the West', on the other, contributed to the development of the 
category of 'inhumane weapons'. Weapons are not classified as inhumane because of 
their objective properties that make them inherently viler than other weapons. 
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Rather, this classification derived from European attempts at the end of the 19 th 
century to prove (not least to themselves) that European societies epitomized 
civilization. As European officials started to identify with this self-representation, 
they established norms (or endowed certain practices with the meaning) of 'civilized 
international conduct'. 
 
In the same sense, the norms of conventional warfare, for example, did not evolve 
because 'standing, standardized, technologically structured' forces made objective 
military sense. Their development is interlinked with dominant political discourses, 
and, when scrutinized, it is clear that these discourses contain elements of cultural 
imperialism. In fact, Farrell's typically conventional constructivist account of how 
these norms evolved to become 'world culture' highlights and to an extent reproduces 
these elements. His account is dealt with in some detail here because it illustrates a 
fundamental point in the discourse on the homogenization of military behaviour that 
conventional constructivist explanations often ignore. 
 
Farrell (2005: 464-465) sketches the historical evolution of the Western military 
model of standing armies and how this is intricately linked with the rise of the 
modern state. He then notes how this model was imposed by the colonial powers on 
their colonies and taken up by other powers to guard against European expansion. 
The professionalization of the officer corps in Europe and the United States by the 
end of the 19th Century was an important driver of global military isomorphism, 
since it became the mechanism through which 'world-wide institutionalisation of 
collective beliefs about appropriate military forms and practices' occurred. 
 
This is also true for contemporary diffusion of these norms, 'which involves officers 
being sent to be trained in foreign academies, and foreign military advisors, military 
literature and equipment being received' (Farrell, 2005: 465). What Farrell 
understands under 'foreign' seems to be 'Western'. He specifically notes that 
'developed states' (the USA, Canada, the UK, Germany and France) run schemes to 
educate foreign military officers. The most prominent of these schemes are the British 
Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) and the US International Military 
Education and Training (IMET) programme, giving world norms an even more 
restricted Anglo- Saxon substance. He definitely does not look to Chinese, Japanese, 
Latin American or African norms of military organization to determine how universal 
the 'world' military norms are. 
 
Farrell then distinguishes between two sets of countries when it comes to the current 
adherence to norms of conventional warfare. For major and regional powers, it makes 
sense - that is, military and economic sense - to follow these norms. On the other 
hand, as emulators become increasingly removed from the position of the great 
powers, in terms of both resource levels and geostrategic circumstances, however, 
isomorphism makes decreasing military sense and is more likely to be due to 
normative pressure. Yet ironically, this is where most of the emulation occurs 
(Farrell, 2005: 465). 
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Normative isomorphism seems for the most part a one-way flow, 'with the poor and 
weak and peripheral copying the rich and strong and central' (John W. Meyer, quoted 
in Farrell, 2005: 466). This Farrell attributes to weak states wanting the prestige 
attached to great-power military symbols, as well as the certainty provided by great-
power scripts for military action. Instead of explicitly looking for deeper explanations 
for this one-way normative isomorphism, he seems to be saying that strong and 
regional powers follow norms of conventional warfare because they make military 
sense for them (are objective and rational). Weak states, on the other hand, follow 
these norms because they are 'cultural dopes' and naively think that adhering to these 
norms will bring about prestige akin to that of major powers. 
 
What Farrell overlooks is that norms of conventional warfare are imagined properties 
of Western militaries sold as 'world culture', not least by his own discussion. The fact 
that other societies emulate these norms is tied in with a certain discourse of 
development. This discourse is largely rooted in the West's conceptions of its own 
development portrayed as progress, growth and expansion. The West's military 
dominance is imagined as confirmation that it has found the way to organize 
militaries, just as the West's economic dominance is interpreted as a sign of its having 
discovered 'the way of life' for human societies (Cornelius Castoriadis, quoted in 
Tomlinson, 1991: 154). In both cases, the West feels it needs to educate other societies 
in these matters. This discourse establishes identities, such as 'developed' and 
'underdeveloped' or 'developing' societies, as well as the relations between them, and 
can be portrayed in terms of cultural domination. 
 
The concept of cultural imperialism, as Tomlinson (1991: 3) notes, is itself the result 
of a largely Western discourse and is invoked by different scholars to mean different 
things. In this article, cultural imperialism is the result of a certain way of perceiving 
'development', one that has its origins in Western societies. Cultural domination is 
not seen as the imposition of a Western way of military organization on another 
society. Rather, cultural imperialism is seen in the Gramscian sense as making certain 
norms that are characteristic of Western societies (some would say the 'Global North') 
seem like common military sense. To be sure, and as Farrell acknowledges, agency 
needs to be recognized in the decision to enact a military script or not. 
 
This relates to the second phase of the two-pronged process of military isomorphism 
through normative pressure. After being articulated, norms are diffused through 
interpellation and enactment. The process of interpellation occurs through 
professional networks, such as BMATT or IMAT, where scripts and norms are taught. 
This is not to say that states slavishly follow these scripts. It does suggest, however, 
that norms become part of a state's cultural raw material, which their agents may 
draw upon when it comes to military practice. Whether norms are emulated is a 
function of cultural match between the discourses that these norms emanate from 
and the local social imaginary (Farrell, 2005: 456). 
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A quotation from Major General Paul Kagame (later to become the president of 
Rwanda) illustrates the point. Kagame asserts: 'We [Rwandans] are used to fighting 
wars in a very cheap way. . . . Our people don't drive tanks, we don't have any 
aircrafts. They don't fight with fighter aircrafts. People move on foot. They eat very 
little food. We are able to go like that for many years without a problem' (quoted in 
Wakabi & Ochieng, 1999). With this statement, he is not saying that Rwandans 
choose not to follow the 'world cultural' norm of a technologically structured force 
because they are too poor or have no military need for it. He is saying that, at that 
particular point in time, Rwandans' understanding of warfare, and indeed of 
themselves and the world, is different from that of Western societies. There is not a 
sufficient perceived cultural match (or overlap) between Rwanda's security imaginary 
and those of Western society from where this norm originates. On the other hand, 
should Rwandans start viewing themselves and warfare in terms that correspond with 
Western military norms, they do not want to be told that they are cultural dopes or 
militarily irrational. This is the liberal fallacy. A number of liberal multinational 
institutions (such as the World Bank, the UN and the IMF) and nongovernmental 
organizations prescribe 'world norms' of disarmament and demilitarization to 
developing countries, but invoke a similar impression of cultural imperialism by 
denying developing countries freedom of choice of the narratives and identities they 
want to enact. 
 
Perceived cultural match (or overlapping social imaginaries) and reinforcing 
discourses are important factors in the process by which one society's security 
imaginary is infused by military models from other societies. If cultures are perceived 
to be mismatched, discourses are not reinforcing, or social imaginaries diverge, 
military models from one society may not come to infuse another's security 
imaginary. Or, they may be constituted quite differently in the adopting society or 
may be adopted for different reasons than originally developed. For example, 
decision-makers in one society may perceive a degree of 'match' about desirable 
weapons and military training, and there may be discursive overlap in the norms 
adhered to in the two societies. If, however, public corruption, while present, is not a 
major force in the 'model' country, whereas it is ever-present in the 'recipient' 
country, perhaps even 'necessary' to sustain the social fabric, the diffused model may 
come to be constituted quite differently in the latter. Charles Taylor (2004: 196), in 
tracing the forms of social imaginaries that grounded the growth of Western 
modernity, offers another possibility: 
If we give its [sic] rightful place to the different understandings that animate similar institutions and 
practices even in the West, it should be all the more obvious how much greater are the differences 
among the major civilizations. The fact that these are in a sense growing closer to each other, and 
learning from each other, doesn't do away with, but only masks the differences, because the 
understanding of what it is to borrow or to come close to the other is often very different from different 
standpoints. 
 
The Western model of military organization is certainly 'the object of creative 
imitation', to use Taylor's (2004: 196) phrase. The reasons for the adoption of a 
certain model and the way in which this model is adapted by non-Western states have 
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deep cultural roots corresponding with these societies' social and security 
imaginaries. Taylor calls the divergent development paths of different societies 
'multiple modernities'. Andrew Feenberg (1995b) even allows for the pursuit of 
'alternative modernity' where the divergence from a particular development path is 
more deliberate. The idea that globalization will homogenize social imaginaries and, 
with them, security imaginaries needs to be viewed with Taylor's cautionary remark 
and Feenberg's margin of possibility in mind. 
Conclusion 
This article set out to contribute an alternative way of thinking about military 
isomorphism through the heuristic of a security imaginary. The security imaginary is 
that part of the social imaginary that deals with the understanding of the security 
world and in turn makes security practices possible. Various scholars have looked at 
specific case-studies to explain military diffusion from a cultural perspective. There 
is, however, a sense that most of these contributions provide weak cultural 
explanations, because they treat culture only as an enabling or inhibiting context for 
emulation, while domestic politics is seen as the actual mechanism that causes 
military diffusion (Goldman 2006: 70). The heuristic of a security imaginary 
contributes to stronger cultural explanations of military emulation by conceptualizing 
the politics of meaning-fixing as part of a process of social representation, which in 
turn provides insight into a society's cultural orthodoxy as such. This approach allows 
us not only to view culture as a causal mechanism for military diffusion, but also to 
investigate how a foreign military model may come to be constituted in and have an 
impact on the constitution of the emulating country. 
 
* Joelien Pretorius is a Lecturer in International Relations at the Department of Political Studies of the 
University of the Western Cape and a member of Pugwash. She recently completed a doctorate on the 
topic of RMA diffusion to South Africa at the University of Cambridge. The author would like to thank 
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